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GAGE

v.

JORDAN

[23 C.2d

the tax rolls and to increase the tax burden on other property with the net effect of penalizing property owners who
pay their taxes.
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellant's and respondents' petitions for a rehearing were
denied April 18, 1944. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.

[L. A. No. 18816. In Bank. Mar. 21,1944.]

RALPH P. GAGE, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JORDAN, as
Secretary of State, etc., et a1., Respondents; RETIREMENT LIFE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a
Corporation) et al., Interveners.
[1] Statutes -

Enactment - Initiative: Construction - Liberal
Construction-Initiative Statutes.-All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions relating to an initiative
measure is to be resolved in its favor, and such legislation
is to be given the same liberal construction as that afforded
election statutes generally.
[2] Constitutional Law-Construction of Constitutions-Intent
of Framers: Statutes-Construction-Giving Effect to Legislative Intent.-Where the language of a constitutional or
statutory provision is susceptible of more than one meaning,
it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the
framers of the legislation, so far as such intent can be ascertained.
[3] Statutes-Construction-Circumstances Indicating Legislative Intent.-The purpose and object sought to be accomplished
by legislation are of prime importance in ascertaining the
legislative intent.

[1] See 23 Cal.Jur. 675; 28 Am.Jur. 153.
McK. ·Dig. References: [1] Statutes, §§69, 205; [2] Constitutional Law, §25; Statutes, §114; [8] Statutes, §124j [4] Constitutional Law, §167; Statutes, §167; [5] Elections, §146(3); [6-10]
Statutes, §69.
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[4] Constitutional Law-Construc.tloD .of Oonstitutions-Absurdity: Statutes-Construction-Absurdity.--Where -the language
of a constitutional or a statutory provision is fairly susceptible
of two constructions, one of which, in a:pplicati?~,:wil1rend~r
it reasonable, fa~ and harmonious ~t.~. ~t~ jlla~i!i~stp~ose;
and another whIch would be productIve o( absurd . ~onse
quences, the former construction:~i1l be.ad~pt,e~:·, . i ,/ ". "
[5] Elections-Mandamus-Duties Enforceable-~repara~i~]l,' of
Ballot.-Mandamus is the proper remedy:to"c\>nip'ef~heSec
retary of State and a county registrar ofvotei-sto omiifrom
any future ballot an initiative measure which oncefailed to
",.'
qualify for want of sufficient signatures. ,::::,;"".'"
[6] Statutes-Enactment-Initiative-Construction,::of ,Constitu;.
tional Provisions.-Const., art. IV, §1, when ~ead in its en:-'
tirety and in connection, with statutes enltCt'ed pursuant thereto connotes an intention that insufficient initiativcpctitionB'
sh~ll lapse and become functus officio; that is, it enforces It
time limitation running from the "last preceding general election" to the "next succeeding general election occurring to
130 days after the presentation aforesaid of snid petition.'~
[7] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional
Provisions.-Inasmuch as under Const., art. IV, §1, the process of circulating initiative petitions must be completed
within a designated time, at the expiration of which it be:comes the ministerial function of the Secretary of State
"forthwith" to certify the measure for the ballot if it has sufficient qualified signatures, the reasonable construction of sai4
section is that if the measure does not qualify, the entire procedure must be instituted anew.
[8] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutiona.l
Provisions.-That part of Const., ~t. IV, §1, which declares
that if any initiative measure be not submitted "at, the election specified in this section," such failure shall not prevent
its submission at a succeeding genera1 election, supports the
construction that a petition which fails to qualify for the ballot does not remain effective indefinitely thereafter, as it is
only in case of the stated exception that a measure may go
on the ballot at an election later than the "succeeding general
election."
[9] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Construction of Constitutional
Provisions.-Those portions of Const., art. IV, §1, which prescribe the manner in which signatures to an initiative petition
are to be affixed and dated support the conclusion that the
[4J See 23 Cal.Jur. 766; 25 R.C.L. 1019.
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life of the petition is limited. It is intended that the signers of the petition shall be qualified electors at the time of
the signing and that the measure shall be submitted at the
next general election, at which they are qualified to vote.

[10] Id.-Enactment-Initiative-Oonstruction of Oonstitutional
Provisions.-'rhe word "presentation," as used in Const., art.
IV, §1, is not synonymous with the word "filing," as used in
said section with reference to an initiative petition being
deemed filed on receipt by the Secretary of State of a certificate showing that the petition has the requisite number of
signatures, so as to make the time at which the required
number of signatures is obtained the time of "presentation."
The reasonable construction is that the additional sections
and supplements necessarily relate back to the "presentation"
date of the first section presented, and thereafter, within the
period, the petition is either "deemed to be flIed" by reason
of the certification of enough signatures, or else it lapses because of its failure to qualify for the subsequent election.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel omission from
ballot of proposed initiative constitutional amendment. Writ
granted.
O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers and Pierce Works for
Petitioner.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Charles W. Johnson
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Arthur McHenry;
Deputy Attorney General, J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel
(Los Angeles), and A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel,
for Respondent.
Ellis E. Patterson, John J. Taheny, Jack B. Tenney Paul
F. Fratessa, Philip C. Boardman, J. Lamar Butler and Lawrence W. Allen for Interveners.
CARTER, J.-Petitioner, a qualified elector of Los Angeles County, applied to this court for a writ of mandate to
compel the Secretary of State and the Registrar of Voters
of Los Angeles County to omit from any ballot at any gen.
~r~l. o~ special :lec~ion to be held in the future, the proposed
InItiative constitutIOnal amendment known as the "Retirement Life Payment Amendment," and entitled by the attorney general, "Gross Income Tax, Warrant Credits." Petitioner also asked that the Secretary of State be compelled
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to correct certificates of qualification transmitted by him
in June, 1943, to the county clerk or registrar of voters of
each county in the state by notifying those officials that 'the
certificates should be disregarded, that the measure has never
qualified, and that it must be omitted from any future ballot.
An alternative writ issued, in return .to which the attorney
general filed a demurrer and answer and the sponsors of the
measure also intervened and answered. There is no dispute
as to the facts. The issues joined present solely the problem
of proper construction and application of article IV, section 1, of the Constitution of this state, particularly the provision of the second paragraph of said section which reads
as follows:
"The ii.rst power reserved to the people shall 'be known as
the initiative. Upon the presentation to the Secretary of
State of a petition certified as herein provided to have been
signed by qualified electors, equal in number to eight per
cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for Governor at
the last preceding general election, at which a Governor was
elected, proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution,
set forth in full in said petition, the Secretary of State shall
submit the said proposed law or amendment to the Constitution to the electors at the next succeeding general election
occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition, or at any special election called by the
Governor in his discretion prior to such general election.
. . ." (Italics ours.)
The initiative measure here involved was first promulgated
in 1940. On March 5th of that year the sponsors obtained
from the attorney general a title and summary preparing
the measure for submission to the voters as proposed article
XXXII of the Constitution. Petitions for signatures were
circulated in various counties and on May 29, 1940, the first
certificates were received by the Secretary of State from
county clerks. Supplemental certificates were received up
to August 16, 1940, when a total of 196,498 signatures of
qualified electors had been certified.
The "last preceding" general election for governor, had
been held in November, 1938, at which 2,651,463 .votes .were
cast. As specified in the above quoted provision, 8 per
cent of this number or. 212,117 signatures were required to
entitle an initiative measure to a place on the ballot "at the
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next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130
days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition." The
circulation of original, as distinguished from supplemental,
petitions had been discontinued on June 28th, which was
exactly 130 days prior to November 5, 1940, the date of the
"next succeeding general election." Therefore, because of
lack of sufficient signatures the measure did not qualify for
a place on the ballot in November, 1940. A last minute attempt to certify enough additional signatures to qualify the
measure was unsuccessful ('1'hompson v. Kerr (1940), 16
Cal.2d 130 (104 P.2d 1021]), and the eertified signatures lay
dormant in the office of the Secretary of State through all of
1941 and 1942.
At the general election in November, 1942, however, only
2,234,545 votes were cast for governor, 8 per cent of that.
number being 178,764. Hence if the qualification, certification, and presentation of signatures to the Secretary of State
in 1940 did not become ineff'3ctive aud void upon' the failure
of the measure to qualify for the 1940 ballot, there were by
reason of the intervening 1942 election, enough signatures
to qualify the measure for the 1944 ballot. Thus the question is directly presented of whether or not an initiative
measure, having once failed to qualify for the ballot for want
of enough signatures, is automatically revitalized by a sufficient decrease in the number of votes cast at a subsequent
gubernatorial election to bring the number of signatures secured within the 8 per cent limit based upon the number of
votes cast at said subsequent election.
In addition, it appears that in 1943, signatures were sought
it;t Imperial County, .where petitions had not previously been
CIrculated, and that m May of that year thirty-nine qualified
signatures .from that county were certified to the Secretary of
State. ThIS made a grand total of 196,537 signatures. But
without these additional signatures there had already been
certified more than sufficient to qualify the measure for the
1944 ballot on the basis of 8 per cent of the votes cast in
1942, if that basis could properly be employed upon the
theory that the time for "presentation" to the Secretary of
St~te (see above quoted provision) had not lapsed upon the
failure of the measure to qualify for the 1940 ballot. Thus
the further question is also presented whether all initiative
petition received by the Secretary of State and continuing
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to be circulated is not to be regarded as finally "presented"
to or "filed" by him until it has sufficient signatures to qualify for the ballot, regardless of how many years this may
take. In this connection, paragraph 13 of section 1, supra,
provides that "a petition shall be deemed to be filed with
the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by him
of a certificate or certificates showing said petiti~n to be
signed by the requisite number of electors of.the ~tate." .
Preliminary to a discussion of these questions,. It may be
noted that the problem is one of first impressio~ up?n which
no authority directly in point has been foundm t~lsor. any
other jurisdiction of the United States. It inUst therefore
be solved by a proper and reasonable construQtion of the
quoted provision, read in pari "}atcria ~th~he'fulrc~n:ext
of the section and all other pertment legislatIOn. -No .Slmllar
situation will arise in the future because the Legislature iII
1943 incorporated in the Elections Code a statlltecontaining a time limitation provision (see Elec. Code,' sec. 1407,
Stats. 1943, p. 1127).
The desirability of having initiative measures,' particularly those of such importance as the present one, reach the
ballot without delay or excessive expenditures of time, money,
and effort is a factor of which the courts are ever mindful.
[1] All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions is to be resolved in favor of the initiative and such
.legislation is to be given the same liberal construction as that
afforded election statutes generally (Ley v. Dominguez
(1931), 212 Cal. 587 [299 P. 713] j see, also, OaZiforrvia
Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934), 1 Ca1.2d 202 [34 P.2d
134] j Willett v. Jordan (1934),1 Cal.2d 461 [35 P.2d 1025] ;
Uhl v. Oollins (1932), 217 Cal. 1 (17 P.2d 99, 88 A.L.R.
1371] j Hinkley v. Wells (1922), 57 Ca1.App. 206' [206 P.
1023] ). [2] However, the interpretation adopted must be reasonable and where the language is susceptible of more than
one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained. (Pacific Indemnity 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom. (1932), 215 Cal. 461, 464 [11 P.2d 1, 82
A.L.R. 1170] j San Francisco v. Industrial Ace. Oom. (1920),
183 Cal. 273 [191 P. 26].) [3] The purpose and object sought
to be accomplished by the legislation are of prime importance in ascertaining that intention (Oity and Oounty of

800

GAGE

v.

JORDAN

[23 C.2d

San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [112 P.2d
595] ; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.
2d 287 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028]; Estate 0/ Ryan,
21 Ca1.2d 498-513 [133 P .2d 626]). [4] Furthermore,
where the language is fairly susceptible of two constructions,
one which, in application will render it reasonable, fair a.nd
harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another WhICh
would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted. (Jersey Maid Milk Products Co.
v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 648 [91 P.2d 577] ; Dept. of Motor
Vehicles v. Industrial Ace. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d
~] ; 23 Ca1.Jur. 766.)
~ [5] Under circumstallces such as those here presented.
mandamus is the proper remedy (Felt v. Waughop, 193 Cal.
498 [225 P. 862] ; Bordwell v. Williams, 173 Cal. 283 [159
P. 869, Ann. Cas. 1918E 358, L.R.A. 1917A, 996]).
[6] Article IV, scction 1, of t.he OonstitutiOl;, whi?h was
adopted in 1911, specifies in detaIl the manner In whIch. the
legislative power reserved to the People may be exercIsed
by means of the initiative and the referendum. It sets forth
a complete plan or scheme and when read in its entirety,
together with statutes enacted pursuant to it, it clearly connotes an intention that insufficient petitions shall lapse and
become functus officio; that is, it imports a time limitation
running from the "last preceding general election" to the
"next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to
130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition."
The significance of the term" presentation" will be discussed
later.
The steps in the initiative procedure are first, the entitling and summarization of the measure by the attorney general (sec. 1, supra, par. 8; Elec. Oode, secs. 1401, 1452), and
second, its circulation among the voters (sec. 1, supra,
par. 9). The petition for signatures of electors may be circulated in sections, each section containing a full and correct
copy of the title and text of the proposed measure (sec. 1,
supra, par. 9). Each section may be filed with the clerk or
registrar of voters of the county in which it was circulated,
but all sections circulated in any county are to be filed at
the same time (sec. 1, supra, par. 10).
There is, it is true, no prohibition against circulation of
sections of petitions in any county indefinitely, and no spe-
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~ific time provision for completion of the entire process other
than the period between general elections prescribed by the
second paragraph of section 1, first herein quoted, or, more
specifically, between a period commencing 130 days befor? a
general election and 130 days before the second succeedIng
election. Obviously, with a then two-year period for registration, it was necessary that the petition be filed with the
county clerk or registrar of voters within such a limited time
as would enable him to determine whether the signers were
qualified electors. The detailed provisions of section 1, providing an entire plan of procedure, impose meticulous time
limitations for completion of various intermediate steps of
the process, all of which would be utterly meaningless if
petitions could be held over as valid indefinitely, or could
be revitalized by any subsequent drop in the gubernatorial
vote.
[7] Consider the following provisions, which seem obviously to be directed at insuring that a measure, if it qualifies,
shall go upon the ballot at the next succeeding general election
occurring 130 days or more after the presentation to the
Secretary of State of the initial certified petition, and that
if it does not qualify, the entire procedure must be instituted anew:
1. The percentage of vote at the "last preceding general
election" determines the qualification standard (sec. 1,
par. 2, supra).
2. The proposed law must, if qualified for the ballot, be
submitted "at the next succeeding general election occurring
subsequent to 130 days after the presentation . . . of said
petition" (sec. 1, par. 2, supra).
3. To insure completion of the process within this period,
the measure must first be submitted to the attorney general
for a title and summary. The submission must be made
"prior to circulation of any initiative petition for signatures
thereof," (Sge art. IV, sec. 1, par. 8), and the attorney general must provide a ballot title and return the measure to
the Secretary of State within 10 days after it is filed with
him (Elec. Oode, secs. 1401, 1452). Paragraph 8, supra, of
section 1, also states that the persons presenting a measure
to the attorney general with a written request for title and
summary "shall be known as 'proponents' of said proposed
measure, " and that "The Attorney General shall preserve
23 O.2d-U
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said written request until after the next general election."
Hence "after the next general election," there is no longer
any title and summary, and without a title and summary
there can be no "proponents" and no "measure."
4. All sections circulated in a county must be filed with
the clerk at the same time, to the end that the signatures
may be checked within the short period of 20 days. As
stated in paragraph 10 of section 1, supra: "Within twenty
days after the filing of such petition in his office the said
clerk or registrar of voters, shall determine from the records
of registration what number of qualified electors have signed
.
the same. . . ."
5. Additional help is provided; to wit: "If necessary the
board of supervisors shall allow said clerk or registrar of
voters additional assistants for the purpose of examining
said petition and provide for their compensation." (Sec. 1,
supra, par. 10.)
6. The clerk or registrar "upon completion" of the examination is to "forthwith transmit" the petition, together with
his certificate to the Secretary of State. (Sec. 1, supra,
par. 10.)
7. The time within which the Secretary of State may act
is definitely limited. "When the Secretary of State shall
have received" the certified petition signed by the requisite
number of qualified electors, "he shall forthwith transmit"
to the clerk or registrar his cer'~ificate showing that fact.
(Italics ours.) (Sec. 1, supra, par. 13.)
8. A limited period for filing supplemental petitions is
specified. "Within forty days from the transmission" of
the petition and certificate by the clerk to the Secretary of
State, a supplemental petition, identical with the original
but containing additional names, may be filed with the clerk
or registrar. (Italics ours.) (Sec. 1, supra, par. 10.)
9. Ten days are allowed the clerk to certify the result of
his examination of the supplemental petition to the Secretary
of State (sec. 1, par. 12, supra).
Hence in each respective county where petitions are circulated, the process must be completed within 70 days from
the first filing of sections of any petition with the county
clerk or registrar, to wit: 20 days to check first sections, 40
days to secure supplemental names, and 10 days to check
supplemental names. At the expiration of this period it
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becomes the ministerial function of the Secretary of State
to forthwith certify the measure for the ballot if it has sufficient qualified signatures, measured by the last preceding
gubernatorial vote (sec. 1, supra, pars. 2, 13).
In view of these express time limits and provisions for
"forthwith" action, any construction of the second paragraph of section 1 which would destroy their effectiveness
and render them meaningless would be clearly unreasonable
and contrary to the intent of the framers of the legislation.
[8] In addition to the evidence of intent supplied by the
provisions above discussed, it may be worthy of note that
paragraph 7 of section 1 affords protection to measures which
have qualified but which, due to negligence or misprision,
have not been placed on the ballot. It provides: "If for
any reason any initiative ... proposed by petition as herein
provided, be not submitted at the election specified in this
section, such failure shall not prevent its submission at a
succeeding general election.... " (Italics ours.) This language affords support for the construction urged by petitioner here because it shows that only in the CaBe of the
.stated exception may a mcasure go on the ballot at an election later than the succeeding general election."
Contemporaneous construction placed upon section 1
by the Le~islature of 1911, the· same Lcgi:;lnturc which
drafted the constitutional provision, is also significant. Political Code, section 4058 (Stat.\;. 1911, p. 577), in specifying
the procedure for county initiatives, provided that if an
initiative petition was found to be insufficient, it should be
"returned to the person filing the sam~, without prejudice,
however, to the filing of a new petition to the same effect."
(Italics ours.) In incorporating this section in the Elections
Code as section 1607, the Legislature of 1943 emphasized
the point by providing that "the failure to secure sufficient
signatures shall not prejudice the filing later of an entirely
new petition to the same effect." A similar provision with
reference to municipal initiatives was also enacted (Stats.
Extra Sess., 1911, chap. 33, p. 131, sec. 1).
The most recent direct expression of the legislative intent is that already referred to, the enactment of new section 1407 of the Elections Code (Stats. 1943, p. 1127) providing that no petitions shall be circulated until after the
official summary date and that first petitions with signatures
(t
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must then be filed with the county clerk or registrar "not
later than 90 days from the 'Official summary date' . . . and
no clerk or registrar of voters shall accept first petitions on
such proposed initiative measure thereafter." Is not this a
clear recognition that the framers of the Constitution never
intended that initiative measures should remain alive for
!ear after ye~r in the hope that they might ultimately qualIfy at some dIstant future election?
[9] The detailed provisions of paragraphs 9 and 10 of
section 1, prescribing the manner in which signatures are to
be affixed and dated also fortify the conclusion that the life
of the petitions is not to be unlimited. The manifest purpose of such provisions, as stated in Ohester v. Hall, 55 Cal.
App. 611 [204 P. 237], and approved in Boggs v. Jordan,
204 Cal. 207, 216 [267 P. 696], "is to guard against signatures by persons who are not qualified electors at the time
of signing," thus making certain that no initiative measure
shall appear upon the ballot unless it has been petitioned for
by the requisite number of electors who are then qualified
to vote upon the measure at the forthcoming election at which
it is to be submitted. In other words, it is intended that the
signers of the petition shall be qualified electors at the time
of signing and that the measure shall be submitted at the
next general election, at which they are qualified to vote.
As electors change each year, through death, coming of age,
rem?val, neglect to qualify, and the like, any construction of
sectlOn 1, supra, which would permit the qualified electors of
one year t.o determine largely the measures liable to go on
the ballot lD a subsequent year would lead to confusion and
uncertaint~, and would be contrary to public policy.
Illustrative of the impossible situation to which such a
co~struction might lead, consider a measure first circulated
prlOr to 1943, upon which signatures are allowed to cumulate
year after year until the measure ultimately qualifies with
refe~enc~ to the last gubernatorial election preceding the last
certIficatlOn to the Secretary of State from any r,ountv in
the state. Under this theory, as long as there remains' one
county out of the fifty-eight in the state in which a section
of the .petition has not been filed, the measure is eligible
to qualIfy at some future gubernatorial election when the
~c~umulative total of signatures of electors, past, present,
lIVlDg, dead, or removed from the state, shall equal the re-
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quired 8 per cent of the vote cast at the then "last preceding election." Such a measure first proposed in 1912 might
ultimately (allowing one filing in one county per year) qualify for the ballot circa A. D. 1970, or if there were one filing
in one county every other year, it might qualify about
A. D. 2028. That the constitutional provision could so operate was obviously never intended by the framers, and such
a construction is too unreasonable to contemplate. Present
day electors are not interested in initiating legislation to be
finally adopted by their children or children's children.
The measure here under consideration was initiated with
the intent that it should appear on the 1940 ballot. Since
that year, there has been a drastic change in economic conditions, the nation has found itself in an exhaustive war,
vast numbers of the people have surged to the western coast
and many others have been removed by reason of war conditions. It may safely be assumed that many who signed as
sponsors of the measure might refuse to sign were it submitted to them today, and the present electorate should not
be burdened with their undertaking. The fact that it is not
only reasonable, but desirable to limit the time for the qualification of initiative measure is commented upon as follows
in the case of State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, 77 Wash. 651
[138 P. 286] :
"It, of course, is necessary that some practical test be provided for determining whether the signers of the petitions
are legal voters. It is, of course, but fair that the petitioris
should, so far as practical, be signed only by those who would
be voters at the election. This can be secured with greater
certainty by having the petitions signed as near the time of
the election as practical. We all know that our electorate
is not the same from year to year. Weare of the opinion
that it is within the power of the Legislature to fix a reasonable limit of time preceding the election within which an
initiative measure may be filed with the Secretary of State."
See, also, State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171 [187
N.E. 301], where a somewhat similar problem was resolved
in accord with the views here expressed.
[10] Much of the argument in the briefs centers upon the
meaning of the word "presentation" as used in section 1,
and its asserted synonymy with the word "filing" as used
in that section. The words in their usual and ordinary
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sense are not generally defined as synonymous. For example,
Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., defines to
"present" as, among other things, "to lay before, or submit
to, a person or body for consideration or action; as to present a memorial, petition, or indictment," whereas to "file"
is defined as: "(a) To deliver (a paper or instrument) to
the proper officer so that it is received by him to be kept on
file, or among the records of his office. (b) Of the receiving
officer, to place (a paper or instrument) on file among the
records of his office by receiving, endorsing, entering, or the
like. " In this state the distinction between the two expressions was early noted in the case of Estate of Giovanni Sbarboro (1883), 63 Cal. 5. To express the difference precisely
it would be proper to say that ordinarily a document is "presented" to an official for "filing," but the filing is subsequent to rather than copcurrent with the presentation.
In section 1 the word "presentation," or "presenting,"
or "presented" appears nine times, while the word "file" or
"filing" or "filed" appears eleven times. Although the respective terms appear clearly to have been chosen with understanding of their exact meaning and to have been used with
precise discrimination, yet it is argued that the "presentation " under paragraph 2 of section 1, first herein quoted,
does not in fact occur until sufficient signatures have been
certified to qualify the measure for the ballot; or, in other
words, that the "presentation" is synonymous with the" filing" referred to in the provision of paragraph 13 of section 1, which states "a petition shall be deemed to be filed
with the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by
him of a certificate or certificates showing said petition to be
signed by the requisite number of electors of the State."
Under this theory it is said that initiative petitions are
neither presented nor filed until they are certified to have
been signed by a sufficient number of qualified electors, and
that this may occur either in the year that the initiative
measure is first promUlgated and sections from certain counties are presented, or in some later year. To state the process another way then, the time at which the requisite percentage of signatures is obtained, is to determine the time
of "presentation" and also which election is the "last preceding general election," and which is the "next succeeding
general election .•• " at which the measure must be submitted

to the voters. In the present case it is said that at no time
prior to November, 1942, did the petitions bear sufficient
signatures; therefore upon the certification in May, 1943, of
thirty-nine signatures from Imperial county, it became the
duty of the Secretary of State to consider the petition finally
"presented" or ., filed, " under the signature computation
based on returns from the then "last preceding general plpetion, " the election of 1942, and to certify the measure for
the ballot in 1944.
The very statement of this complex proposi~ion ~s indicative of its weakness. Section 1 clearly proVIdes m express terms for "presentation" to the Secretary of State of
a certified petition, which is to qualify the ~eas.ure for. the
ballot at the next succeeding general electIon If sufficIent
signatures are obtained within the required time. It contemplates that all steps in the initiative proceeding, shall. be
taken not less than 130 days prior to the general electIOn
next following the institution of the proceeding, and that
the sufficiency of the petition is to be tested by the last pre- .
ceding gubernatorial vote. In view of the privilege given of
circulating the petition in sections, and of filing supplements
to it, it appears that the additional sections and supplements
necessarily relate back to the" presentation" date of the first
section presented. Thereafter, within the PE?riod, the petition is either "deemed to be filed" by reason of the certifica~
tion of enough signatures, or else it lapses because of its failure to qualify for the subsequent election. This construction
is not only reasonable, but it gives effect to all of the pertinent provisions of the section without straining the phraseology, and it appears to accord with the intent of the fram.ers
of the legislation: That the presentation precedes the filmg
of the petition is indicated by the provision in paragraph 9
of section 1 that: "Unless and until it be otherwise proven
upon official investigation, it shall be presumed that the petition presented contains the signatures of the requisite number of qualified electors." This must refer to the required
8 per cent as there is no limit on the number of signatures
to be obtained in any particular county and the Secretary
of State is the official whose duty it is to determine the requi~
site number of qualified signers to authorize the filing of a
petiticm.
Here the petition was "presented" in May, 1940; the "last
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preceding general election" was the election of 1938, hence
the petition lapsed when it failed to qualify for the November, 1940 ballot.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur. Under the theory advocated by
respondents and interveners, a group of persons, relatively
small in the total population of the state, could settle in one
county, register as electors, sign sections of the petition, file
it in that county, then move on to another county, register
there, sign and file new sections of the petition there, and
repeat the process in as many counties of the state and over
such a period of time as might be necessary to reach the goal
of the number of qualified signatures equal to 8 per cent
of the number of votes cast for governor at some election
many years subsequent to the presentation of the first section
of the petition.
Although the constitutional provision is unfortunately ambiguous, this court could not justify giving it a construction
which would not only admit of, but would commit us to permit, such an absurd application of the law as that suggested
above. Furthermore, to uphold respondents' and interveners' contentions that the constitutional provision contains
no limitation upon the time within which petitions must be
qualified would be tantamount to holding that the pertinent
1943 act of the Legislature (Elec. Code, sec. 1407; Stats.
1943, p. 1127) is unconstitutional.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-The vital question in this
proceeding is whether an initiative petition that fails for
want of enough signatures to qualify the proposed measure
for submission to the voters at the next general election after
the receipt of the petition by the Secretary of State, remains
effective indefinitely thereafter, enabling the proposed measure to qualify for the ballot on the basis of any general election for governor that succeeds the receipt of the petition by
the Secreta.ry of State. The answer to this question turns
on the meaning of the second paragraph of section 1 of article IV of the California Constitution, which provides:
"Upon the presentation to the Secretary of State of a petition certified as herein provided to have been signed by quali-
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tied electors, equal in number to eight' per cent of all the
votes cast for all candidates for Gov:ernor at the last preeeding general election, at which a Governor was elected,
proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution, set forth
in full in said petition, the Secretary of State shall submit
the said proposed law or amendment to the Oonstitution to
the electors at the next succeeding general election occurring
subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid .of
said petition, or at any special election called by the Governor
in his discretion prior to such general election."
This provision is ambiguous. It does not make clear what
constitutes the presentation of the petition, for it speaks, not
simply of the presentation of a petition, but of the presentation of a petition certified to have been signed !by the requisite number of qualified electors. It cannot be determined
whether such a petition has been presented without first ascertaining what is the last preceding general election, which
is the basis for determining whether the 8 per cent requirement has been met. The last general election preceding the
presentation of the petition, however, as well as "the next
succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days
after the presentation" of the petition, cannot be ascertained
without first determining what constitutes that presentation. The identification of either event depends upon the
identification of the other under a literal construction of the
second paragraph of section 1, and is therefore bound to be
frustrated in this circle.
The attorney general, conceding that the paragraph in
question is ambiguous, contends that the riddle is solved by
the thirteenth paragraph of section 1 if the word "filed"
therein is construed, as he contends it should be, to mean
"presented." That paragraph provides: "A petition shall
be deemed to be filed with the Secretary of State upon the
date of the receipt by him of a certificate or certificates
showing said petition to be signed by the requisite number
of electors of thc State." Even if it were assumed that the
word "filed" in the forcgoing- provision is synonymous with
the word "presented," however, the last preceding general
election as well as the presentation of the petition, would remain unidentified, for the petition would not be filed or
presented until the Secretary of State received certificates
showing the petition "to be signed by the requisite number
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of electors of the state." Since the Secretary of State would
not know whether the petition was signed by "the requisite
number of electors of the state" until he knew what" the last
preceding general election" was, the attorney general's contention leads directly back to the second paragraph of section 1.
It is contended that since the petition may be presented
in sections, the presentation of the petition is not it sin~l€'
act but a continuing process. Under this theory the receIpt
of the last certificate is as much a presentation of the petition as the receipt of the first, so that the last preceding
general election may be regarded as the one preceding the
receipt of the last certificate if all the certificates show that
the petition has been signed by the requisite number of electors. There is no more reason, however, for selecting the
date of receipt of the last certificate as the date of presentation than there would be for selecting the date of receipt of
the first. Moreover, if all the certificates in the hands of
the Secretary of State prior to 130 days before the next
general election do not show that the petition has been signed
by the requisite number of electors the receipt of neither the
first certificate nor the last can fix the date of presentation.
The contention is then advanced that regardless of how
many general· elections occur after the certificates are first
received by the Secretary of State, as soon as any general
election occurs at which a governor is elected and at which
the total number of votes cast for all candidates for governor
is such that the total signatures shown by the certificates
then in the hands of the Secretary of State equals at least
8 per cent of that total vote, the petition must be regarded
as presented, and that election becomes the "last preceding
general election." Under this theory the date of presentation would be a constantly shifting one that would not become fi.'{ed unless the number of signatures certified to be
signed to the petition equalled at least 8 per cent of the votes
cast at the most recent ~(Jncral election at which a governor
was elected. The identification of one unknown, namely, the
date of presentation, is thus arrived at by determining that
the other unknown, namely, "the last preceding general election," is any general election after the initiation of the process that would qualify the measure. Under this interpretation the words "the last preceding general election at which
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a governor was elected" would become the most recent general election at which 8 per cent of the total number of·
votes cast for all candidates for governor equals or falls short
of the number of signatures certified to have been· signed to
the petition. "The last preceding general election " could
thus be any general election succeeding the institution of the
initiative proceeding, depending upon the number of votes
cast at the election and on the number of signatures certified
to be signed to the petition. The words t I the last preceding
general election" however indicate plainly that the framers
of section 1 were referring to one particular election. The
general election preceding the institution of the initiative
proceeding seems more likely to be in. accord with their intention than one of a number of general elections succeeding
the institution of such proceeding. In any event, the attorney general's interpretation is certainly not compelled by the
language of section 1. Since it would lead to the absurdities
so graphically described in the majority opinion and thus
violate the principle that constitutional provisions will not
be interpreted to produce an unreasonable or absurd result,
it must be rejected. (See 23 Cal.Jur. 722-3; 766-7.)
It remains for the court, therefore, in the light of section '1
as a whole, to identify "the last preceding general election,"
as well as the presentation of the petition, so that the section
can operate in accord with the probable intention of its framers. A consideration of the instances in which there can be
no doubt as to the operation of the section removes much
of the confusion regarding its operation in a case like the
present one.
,
If the Secretary of State receives a petition, prior to 130
days before the next general election, certified to be signed
by electors equal in number to at least 8. per cent of all the
votes cast for governor at the general ,election at which a
governor was elected preceding the, receipt of the, petition,
he must submit the proposed law or constitutional amendment to the electors at that next general election, or stan"
special election called by the governor before such general
election. If he receives a petition that, prior·to,130, days
before the next general election, is not so certmed,jle cannot
submit the proposed law or constitutional amendment to the:
voters at that next general election, or at any: ,intervening
special election. What happens to such a petition t Is it
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revitalized by the receipt of additional certificates certifying
that more signatures have been added to the petition? If
the base election for determining whether the petition has
the requisite number of signatures is the election preceding
the receipt of the petition by the Secretary of State, it would
be idle for the Secretary of State to receive additional certificates certifying that more signatures have been added to
the petition, for it cannot be submitted at the next general
election following the receipt by the Secretary of State of the
petition. That election may already have been held. In any
event the 130-day requirement canllot be met; for that reason the Secretary of State in 1940 refused to accept signatures from Tuolumne County certified to be signed to the
very petition involved in this case, for they were received
within less than 130 days before the election held on November 5, 1940.
It appears from the foregoing description of the procedure followed when a proposed measure clearly does or does
not qualify for submission at a particular election, that the
base election must be the election preceding the receipt of
the petition by the Secretary of State, for otherwise he could
never determine whether a petition had, within the time
prescribed, the requisite number of signatures. He makes
that determination in the only way that he can under the
Constitution by ascertaining the total vote for all candidates
for governor at the last general election at which a governor
was elected preceding the receipt by him of the petition. If
the petition were not regarded as presented to him, he could
not proceed with his determination whether it had, within
the prescribed time, the requisite number of signatures. Only
by regarding the receipt by him of the petition as the presentation of the petition to him can he determine what is the
next preceding general election, the basis of his determination whether the petition has been signed within the prescribed time by electors equal in number to at least 8 per
cent of the total vote for all candidates for governor at
that election.
Since the foregoing procedure is the one that the Secretary of State follows, and the only one that he can follow if
he is to comply with the 8 per cent requirement and the 130day limitation in passing upon initiative measures that
clearly do or do not qualify for submission to the electors
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at a particular general election, it must be regarded' as' the
procedure that the framers of section 1 envisaged for all
cases. This procedure conforms to the provisions of section 1.
Thus it appears that the presentation of the petition may be
made in sections (par. 9); that the presentation of each ..
section consists of the transmission by a county clerk' or registrar of a printed copy of the petition with his certificate
showing the number of qualified signatures thereto that have
been filed in his county (par. 10); that the presentation of
the several sections may occur at different times, since each
county clerk or registrar is required to transmit his section
as soon as he completes his examination of the signatures
(par. 10); that the Secretary of State has no duty to perform in this regard other than' to receive' the sections presented to him by the county clerks or registrars until the
total number of signatures certified in the severaJ sections
is at least 8 per cent of all the votes cast for gov.ernor at
the last general election at which a governor was elected preceding the presentation. If the signatures certified in the
sections meet that requirement prior to 130 days before the
next succeeding general election, the Secretary of State must
submit the proposed measure at that election. It follows that
a petition is presented to the Secretary of State upon the first
date when one or more sections, containing "a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measure" are
received by him duly accompanied by a certificate from the
county clerk or clerks transmitting the petition as to the
number of signatures obtained in the particular county or
counties. Thereafter the Secretary of State simply keeps
count of additional signatures certified to be signed to the
petition, to determine whether or not the measure qualifies
for submission at the next general election occurring more
than 130 days after the receipt of the petition. If it qualifies it goes on the ballot; if not, it does not go on the ballot
and is thenceforth defunct. The Secretary of State is without authority to submit a measure at a subsequent election,
that does not qualify for submission at the election succeeding the presentation of the petition, for the Constitution authorizes submission of the measure only at the next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after
the presentation of the petition or at any special election
called by the Governor before such general election. If the
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measure qualifies for submission to the electors at that next
succeeding general election, however, but for any reason it
is not submitted
.
, then under the seventh paragraph of .section 1, it may be submitted at a succeeding general electlOn.
Since the proposed measure did not qualify under the prescribed procedure for submission to the electors at the election held on November 5, 1940, and since the Constitution
does not authorize the Secretary of State to submit, at any
subsequent election, a measure that fails to qualify for the
next succeeding general election occurring after the presentation of the petition, the proposed measure cannot be submitted to the electors.
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-In 1911, by an amendment
to the Constitution, the People of California declared that
they "reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and
amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the
same at the polls independent of the Legislature, , . ." Election laws are to be liberally construed, and a proposed initiative measure should hav; a place upon the ballot unless,
considering the fundamental purpose of the constitutional
reservation of power, it may fairly be said that the requirements for such legislation have not been met. Indeed, ,courts
should protect the right of the people to initiate and vote
upon a measure which, in the opinion of some electors, would
advance social or economic conditions, with the same regard
for democratic principles as is demanded when the right of
free speech is under consideration. Yet by the decision in
the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution does not directly limit the time within which a petition
to place a proposed measure on the ballot may be circulated,
because of general provisions specifying the procedure to be
followed in connection with the verification of voters' signatures by the county election officials, the People are denied
the right to vote upon "The Retirement Life Payments
Amendment. " I cannot subscribe to such a narrow construction of the Constitution.
Certainly paragraph 2 of the constitutional provision is
unfortunately worded. It declares: "Upon the presentation
to the Secretary of State of a petition certified as herein
provided to have been signed by qualified electors, equal in
number to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candi.
dates for Governor at the last preceding general election,
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at which a Governor was elected, proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution, set forth in full in said petition,
the Secretary of State shall submit the said proposed law or
amendment to the Constitution to the electors at the next
succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days
after the presentation aforesaid of said petition, or at any
special election called by the Governor in his discretion prior
to such general election." (Const., art. IV, sec. 1.) The use
of the word "presentation" in the quoted sentence giV'Eis rise
to the principal difficulty in this case, for the Constituti?n also
specifies: "A petition shall be deemed to be filed WIth the
Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt 'by him of a
certificate or certificates showing said petition to. be signed
by the reqUisite number of electors of the State." But ~he~
all of the constitutional provisions are read together, It IS.
clear that a petition, as distinguished from a section of a
petition, is presented to the Secretary of State only when it
bears a sufficient number of signatures to qualify the proposed measure for a place upon the ballot.
The constitutional provision specifying the procedure for
the qualification and submission of an initiative or referendum measure uses the word "presentation" or "presenting"
or "presented" nine times. The word "file" or "filing" or
"filed" appears eleven times. The use of each of these words,
when considered in connection with its context, shows a discriminating choice of language. For example: "Any initiative or referendum petition may be presented in sections, but
each section shall contain a full and correct copy of the title
and text of the proposed measure."
Certainly the word
•
',..1.. "filed , "
"presented" as here used IS
not synonymous Whu
for an initiative measure "shall be deemed to be filed" with
the Secretary of State only when he has received a certificate or certificates signed by the requisite number ofelectol'S.
Other sentences also show that the Constitution's' draftsman clearly understood the meaning of the words he selected.,
The sponsors of an initiative measure are de~ed as the per.~
sons "presenting" a request to the attorney general for th~
preparation of a title and summary of it. By 'ilnother p~o~
vision the persons who shall "prepare and present"argti~
ments for and against each measure shall be selected b~ the
presiding officer of the Senate. Ina subsequent paragraph
relating to the rights of proponents, there is a restriction con~

.
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cerning any section or supplement "presented for filing."
1\. use of the ".ord in the same manner appears in the

requirement as to the printing of the title, "Initiative measure to be presented to the Legislature." Here are instances
of a precise usc of the word "present" in its customary and
usual meaning, which is: "To lay before, or submit to, a
person or body for consideration or action; a..~ to present
a memorial, petition or indictment." (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed.) But the filing of a paper or
document connotes the finality of official action which follows
presentation.
Applying these definitions to the constitutional provisions,
it clearly appears that the "presentation" to the Secretary
of State of a petition certified as having been signed by the
required number of qualified electors is not a single act.
"Any initiative ... petition may be presented in sections,"
the Constitution reads. Each county clerk or registrar of
voters must examine the signatures upon each section of a
petition filed with him. As soon as he completes such examination, he shall "forthwith" attach his certificate to a copy
of the petition, except the signatures, "and shall forthwith
transmit said petition, together with his said certificate" to
the Secretary of State. Obviously, in practice, these documents will be received at different times, and, of necessity,
the "presentation" to the Secretary of State of a petition
by sections can only be made by the delivery to him, through
a county clerk or registrar of voters, of a copy of the petition
with a certificate made by the local election officer that it has
been signed by a stated number of electors, qualified .to do so.
Other than to receive the sections, the Secretary of Sfate has
no duty to perform unless and until the aggregate "of the
number of signers certified in the several sections amounts
"to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for
Governor at the last preceding general election at which a
Governor was p.lected." If and when the number of signatures as certified to him total that amount, the petition" shall
be deemed to be filed" and he shall "submit the said proposed law or amendment to the Constitution to the electors .... "
Under this construction, there is no time limit within
which the qualification of an initiative petition must be completed. Sections of the petition may be circulated indefi-
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nitely in any county. But upon the filing of a sectionfu0r
sections with a county clerk or registrar of vo~er~, all rther action in that county must be completed .WlthI~ seve~ty
days. There is no prohibition, however, a~amst CIrculatIon
of the petition in any other county, and SIgnatures may be
obtain cd until the aggregate of them, as certified by the local
election officials, reaches the required number..
.
.
Admittedlv with no limitation of time for the qualification
of a propos~d measure except the requirem~nts. as. to circu·
lation in a particular county, a law or conStIt~t~onalamend
ment might be submitted to electors many years. after the
petition for its enactment was signed by some of them.. But
a court may not place restrictions upo~ the procedure fo;
direct legislation which are not found eIther In th.e CO~StI~
. tution or in any statute enacted to facilitate i~s 0I?eratI?n.
Certainly section 45 of the Elections Code,' whlch IS rehed
upon by counsel for Gage, makes no requirement, ,as to the
time when an initiative measure must be placed upon the
ballot. Based upon section 1083a of the Politic&, Code,. a
predecessor statute, it declares that o~;y .0n,e who~s. a regis·
tered qualified elector may sign an !m~IatIve pe~Itlon, and
that he must also write the date of SIgnmg and hIS place of
residence. In Ohester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611 [204 P. 237],
the Political Code section was upheld as legislation which
facilitates the operation of the constitutional plan and places
safeguards around the exercise of the right to have a pro·
posed law or constitutional amendment voted on by the people. (See, also, Boggs v. Jordan, 204 Cal. 207, 214 [267 P.
696].) But the statute cannot reasonably ?e. ~o~trued .~ a
requirement either that each signe~ of an mlt~atIve. pe~ItIon
be a qualified elector both at the time of. affixmg hIS sI~a
ture· and on the date of the election at WhICh the propOSItIon
is submitted to a vote, or as a restriction upon the time within
which such a petition may be presented to the Secretary of
State.
As another ground for the issuance of a writ of I?andate
in this proceeding, it is insisted that the gubernatorIal election which fixes the number of signatures required for a
petition is the one which i~med~ately preced~s every step
in the initiative procedure mcludmg presentatIon. In. ~up
port of that construction, reference. is made to. provlsI~ns
of the Constitution and of the ElectIons Code Wlth relation
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to the preparation of a title and summary for any proposed
measure.
Sect.ion ~452 of the Elections Cod~ allows anyone interested In dIrect legislation, "at any time prior to one hundred thirty days before the clection at which the measure
is to be voted upon," to request a ballot title for it. As construed by c~unsel for Gae-e, this means that the request must
be made prIor to 130 days before the next gencral election.
But the language cannot be so limited. By the express terms
of the statute, the election at which the proposed measure is
to be voted upon need not necessarily be the next one after
the r~qu~t for a title is made, and the proponents of the
constItutIOnal amendment which is the subject of the present ~roceeding, mor~ than 130 days before the date of any
ele~tIOn to be held In the year 1943,complied with the reqUIrement regarding entitlement.
The constitutional. mandate directing the attorney general
~~ p~eserve the wrItten request for a title and summary
untIl after th.e next general election" (art. IV, sec. 1,
pa~. 8), also relIed upon by counsel for Gage, is more to the
POInt. From this language it is argued that the initiative
procl!ss must be commenced and completed between two consecutive general elections. Certainly the direction to the
attorney general affords some basis for believing that the
draftsman of the Constitution intended that the record of
the request for entitlement be kept only until the electors
had voted upon the measure, and that this would occur at
"the .next gen:ral electi~n." Bu~ su~h a conclusion is largely
~urmIse, and In construIng constItutIonal provisions eoncernIn~ a matter so important to the public interest as the legislatIve ~ower reserved to the people, a limitation of time may
not be Implied where none is expressed. Both constitutional
and. statutory provisions relating to direct legislation should
b~ lIberally c~n~trued with a purpose to protect the reserved
rIght of the CItIzen. (Uhl v. C~llins, 217 Cal. 1 [17 P.2d 99~
~~3t)L.R. 1371J; Ley v. Dom~nguez, 212 Cal. 587 [299 P:
And .as I read the opinion in State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers,
127: ?hIO St. 171 [187 N.E. 301], the decision supports the
pOSItIon of the Secretary of State in the present case. Under
t~e ~hio Constitution, the court held, the "preceding election to be used as a base for computing the qualification of
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an initiative petition "is clearly the election immediately
preceding the filing of the petition." The record showed
that the date of filing was one day prior to the gubernatorial
election of 1932. Subsequent to that election the Secretary
of State ascertained that, based upon the vote cast for Governor in 1930, which was tho tllection for Governor next
preceding the filing of the petition, there were insufficient
signatures to qualify the measure. Thereafter, additional
signatures were procured and filed. Upon the basis of the
vote cast at the election of 1930, the' petition then had the
necessary number to qualify the proposal. According to the
election of 1932, it still lacked the number fixed by the Constitution as requiring submission to the electors. The court
decided that the election of 1930 governed.
Apparently in Ohio, although a petition is circulated for
signature in separate parts, all of the parts are filed' with
the Secretary of State who ascertains the number of signatures which are valid. The date upon which the petition
was filed, said the court, determined the "preceding election" which must be used as a base in determining its qualification although another gubernatorial election had intervened during the time allowed for securing additional signatures. Using the date of filing as the decisive factor in the
present proceeding, "the last preceding general election at
which a Governor was elected" is the one of 1942.
To me, the action of the Legislature of 1911 fortifies this
conclusion, for the' statutes enacted at that time, as I read
them, show a purpose to place a limitation upon the circulation and qualification of a county and a city' initiative
measure which does not apply to one to be submitted to the
electors of the entire state. 'In that year, section 4058
the Political Code was enacted. It made provision for the
submission to the electors of a county of either an initiative
or a referendum measure, and declared that any petition for
that purpose which was found insufficient shouid be returned
to "the person filing the same, without prejudice, however, to
the filing of a new petition to the same effect." Other legislation related to the procedure for initiative and referendum
measures in cities and towns and also directed that any petition found insufficient should be returned to its proponent.
(Stats. 1911, p. 359.) Subsequently, by action at the extra
session of 1911, the Legislature declared that in lieu of r~

of
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turning an insufficient petition, it should remain on file as
a public record. (Stats. Ex. Sess. 1911, p. 125 as to county
measures; p. 131 as to city or town proposals.)
Certainly the legislative action shows an awareness that
the Constitution does not limit the time for the circulation
and qualification of a proposed initiative measure and a determination that there should be a restricted period during
which a petition may be signed by electors and submitted to
a vote in a county, a city or a town. The enactment of 1943
also indicates legislative cognizance that the Constitution does
not set any particular period for the circulation of an initiative petition (other than that relating to the examination of
signatures by local election officials), and the qualification of
the proposal. Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution is
self-executing, "but legislation may be enacted to facilitate
its operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either the
provisions of this section or the powers herein reserved."
In connection with the declaration of the Constitution, it
may be noted that this court, in accordance with what it
declared to be the uniform rule, has upheld the power of
the Legislature "to enact statutes providing for reasonable
regulation and control of rights granted under the constitutional provisions." (Ohesney v. Byram, 15 Ca1.2d 460,
465 [101 P.2d 1106J.) Other cases to the same effect include
First M. E. Ohurch v. Los Angelos Oounty, 204 Cal. 201
[267 P. 703J, and Ohester v. Hall, supra.
For these reasons and, in particular, giving effect to the
cardinal rule of construction that every intendment of the
constitutional provisions and of statutes enacted to facilitate
their operation is in favor of the qualification of an initiative
measure, I believe that the electors of the state are entitled
to vote upon "The Retirement Life Payments Amendment."
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied April 17,
1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.
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WILLIAM B. McKESSON, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL J.
DONAGHUE, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Respondent.
Provisions - Constitutionality. -:- E~ec.
Code, §§10600.10602, regulating the method of nomInatIng
and voting for candidates for judicial offices only, does not
violate the "uniformity" provisions of Const., art. I, §l1j art.
IV §25. The distinction is It natural and reasonable one p~
su~nt to the treatment of the judiciary as a separate class In
Const., art. VI.
[2] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for Judicial. 01l1ce.-In determining whether a candidate for judicial office must file a
preliminary "declaration of his intention" un.der Ele.c. Cod?;
§10601.5, when a sponsor's declaration of h1s. cand1dac~ 1S.
executed (see Elec. Code, §§2612-2617), all pertInent sectIo~s'
of the Elections Code must be reltd together and construed In
a manner consistent with thf'ir respective purposes. . .
[3] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for JUdicial Office-Construc-,
tion of Statutes.-The efficient operation of the sponsor
method of candidacy and the method of personal declaration,
does not sustain the application of the provisions of Ele?
Code, §10601 or §10601.5, to the sponsor m.ethod, and oomphance with said sections is intended to be Incumbent only on,
Cltndidates for judicial office by virtue of personal declaration therefor. The five-day gap provided in Elec. CoM,
§§10601, 10601.5, before nomination papers either by the candidate or sponsors may be filed correlates the purpose of the
advance declaration of intention with the independent sponsor method of nomination.
[1] Elections-Statutory

[4] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for Judicial. Office-Indication
of Particular Office.-Elec. Code, §10602, requiring that the:

indication of the particular judicial office for which the aspirant is to be a candidate must ap~ear in th~ "declaration of
intention" should in case of a cand1date nomInated under the.
sponsor method, ~ppear either in the sponsors' declar~tio~ of
candidacy or in the candidate's acceptance of the nomInation.
[5] ld.-Nominations-Candidates for Judicial O:ftice-Declaration of lntention.-Inasmuch as under Elec. Code, §10601,
10601.5, only the candidates for judicial office. may file the
"declaration of intention," it is not necessary, In the case of
[5J See 10 CaI.Jur. 69; 18 Am.Jur. 256.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Elections, §6j [2-5J Elections, §38.

